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THE SOFT POWER DILEMMA: CAN THE EUROPEAN
UNION SACRIFICE THE CARROT AND THE STICK
AND COMMAND WITH SOFT POWER ALONE?
Helen Pollock
The end of th e 20th and the beginning of the 2 1st ce nt ur ies are o ften described as
a "unipolar moment ,"I a tim e when th e United States sup ervi sed the ent ire world . It has
bankrolled wars, exe rcised its power in internation al institutions, and acted as a glo bal
watchdog to keep the othe r nations in line. But the U nited States' method s are fallin g o ut
of favor in the int ernation al comm unity , and th e European Union nIay have th e pot enti al
to share SOm e of the United States' responsibilities. What was o nce a loose coalitio n of only
six states is now an o rganizatio n representing tw enty-seven nati on s, with a currency rivaling
and even ov erpowering th e dollar, and the sing le largest econo mic mark er in the world .?
However, the E U does not have the capacity to use hard po wer as effectively as a nation
like the United Stares, This paper will examine the EU's use of soft power to influence in-
reruation al outco mes, and evaluate wh eth er the E U can afford to rely not on hard military
or econ omic power, but on its soft power capabilities.
LIMITATIONS ON THE EU's MILITARY HARD POWER
As <I n acto r in internatio nal politi cs, the EU has th e option of using two method s to in -
fluence othe r nation s and poli cy outcom es: wielding hard power or soft po wer. H ard po wer
is <In actor's abilit y to influence the de cisions of another global ent ity throu gh "inducements
(carro ts) or threat s (sticks) ," and it is used most frequ ently in th e form of military po wer and
econo mic power .:' The EU has the potential to use both , but in practi ce, it rarely puts either
to use. First , for a co mplete understanding of th e EU's military hard power, two issues must
be addressed: the military capabilities of th e EU's member states and th e capabilities of the
EU as <I who le. As separate nati ons , th e member states of th e EU have 1.6 milli on troops
and spend E' 160 billion o n defense (statistics second only to the United States) and two of
the m ember states are nucl ear po wers." Although th e US and th e EU have roughly th e same
number of men and women under arms, the EU states spend only 40 percent o f what the
U S spe nds on th eir military, and allocates mu ch less of it to research and devel opment or
airlift capabilities." In fact , these statistics do not reflect actual deploym ent capability ; man y
of the member states' troops are not well trained for battle, since they perform mostly non-
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co m bat casks, and so me of rhein are co nsc ripted so ldiers . In addi tion , th ese troop s ca nnot be
com mi tte d quickl y to a conflict, because bureau cratic react ion tim e is relat ively slow , and
m an y of these for ces are also currentl y dedicated to N AT O operations."
It is important to distinguish be twee n the tr oop s of these indi vidu al states and EU
forces, becau se only E U fo rces can be deplo yed by th e o rganizatio n. The capabilities of th e
E U as a whole have been growing since 1999, b ut to da te, th e " rea lity of E U depl oym ent
remains co nfined to human itarian and resc ue tasks, peacek eeping tasks, and tasks fo r co m bat
forces in crisis m an agem ent ." ? The curre nt effo rt fo r a Europe an "army" takes the f0 11n of
E U " battlegro ups." The 1,500-man EU battlegroups can be deployed wi th in 5 to 10 days
of receiving order s and tailored to specific operations." Des pite the commitm ent of 100. 000
tro op s, 400 aircraft , and 100 naval vessels to the proj ect , it does not constitu te a stand ing
army . These fo rces arc earma rked o nly, and can not be de ploye d instantan eo usly. Provi sions
of th e plan also give m ember states the right to refu se to de ploy th eir sha re of th e forces ,"
which co uld ham string any operation.
As it stands, th e EU has no official a11n y to use as military hard power - whether as a
"st ick" to deter acti on o r as the m eans to go to war. Without an army or a m eans of depl oy-
ing tro ops, th e EU has no hope of app lying military hard power. This is largely the result
of two limits o n E U milita ry power: th e ex ten t of integratio n and the re liance on th e U S
for sec urity .
The first and m ost important lim it on milita ry hard power th rou gh a European a11ny is
Eu rop ean integration . By encompassing 27 states, alo ng with their lan gu ages, incompatibl e
domestic legal struc tures, and nation al identities and biases," the EU has discovered th at it
is nea rly impossible to unite all of the me m ber sta tes unde r a common for eign poli cy. The
tl ilures of int egration we re obv io us in Koso vo during its bid for ind ep en den ce in 200!); th e
EU made a blan ket state me nt in suppo rt of Kosovo , bur Spain - having a Basqu e popula-
tion of its own clamoring for sovere ignty - refu sed to j o in th e co nunon poli cy.11 The EU
grapples with conflicting political agen das and ev en multiple states w ith m ilitary neutralit y,
as we ll as a hi story of co nflict and figh ting between th em. In the gu arded political clim ate
after World W ar II , th e European natio ns rebuilt and becam e fiercely protective of th ei r
sovere ignty. In add itio n, man y of the co untries' strong nation alistic pride dates back to th e
im pe rial age and beyond; Grea t Britain , Spain, Germa ny. Fran ce, Italy, and o the r members
have had a taste of em pire and domination , and th eir citize ns rem em ber th eir nati on's hey-
day . National identity is an everyday ro adblock to an int egrated fore ign policy, and thus
lim its th e institution of a military fo rce.
T he U nited Sta res is an important obstructio n to EU military power because th e EU
has lon g relied on th e U S fo r its security need s th rou gh NATO , crea ting a " transatlantic
dep enden ce. " 12 The Atlantic alliance is an "ext ra insura nce policy" agains t aggressio n from
m ember states or outside powers like Russia. ':' While th e co llapse of the U SSR and th e end
of th e C old W ar " in th eory freed Europe from th e need for American leadership, th e Balkan
wars of the 19 90s revealed that E uropea ns still dep ended on the U S to ke ep peace on th eir
own soil."!' Since U S fo rces m anaged m ost of th e major co nflicts th rou gh the 1990s, m an y
EU co unt ries lim ited th ei r own defen se spending. In Koso vo in ea rly 200R, th e Uni ted
States, not th e E uropea n Union , opposed Russian sup po rt for main ta ining Serbia's co ntrol
and ensur ed th e protec tion of Kosovo 's new sovereignty. EU m em ber states (wi th the ex-
cep tion of Spain) suppo rted Kosov o through NATO , not through any formal Europ ean
institutio n . The EU had no coll ecti ve military hard powe r with which it could interv ene,
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and could not even reach a co nsensus o n wh at actio n should he taken , leaving the conflict
largel y in another power's hands.
LIMITATIONS ON THE EU's ECONOMIC HARD POWER
The EU is the largest eco no mic market in the world , with 458 million co nsume rs,
more than the US and Japan combined ." Its members "create about one qu arter of th e
world's gross nati onal produ ct and one fifth of the world' s commerce. "I" In addition , the
co m bined GDP of its member states is alm ost $12 triJlion 17 and with the integration of th eir
currencies, th ere is increasing demand for th e euro to take ov er as an alternative int ern a-
tional reserve currency. IS The EU is now an econ omic giant, with the currency, the market,
and the economic power to prove it.
The EU is also qui ckly becoming an econ omic regulatory power becau se of its ability
to en courage other countries to adopt its standards and its talent for using glob alization for
its own ends. The EU can refuse access to its m arket - a hu ge blow to any compauy - unl ess
a country adopts its produ ction standards; the organization has also subsidized the adoption
of th ose standards in dev eloping count ries, making it free o r at least affordable to comply
with the regulati ons." As th e number of countries involved in the EU's regulated market
increases, it can exe rt greater pressure on th e nations th at have not complied. As a result
of EU-established standards, farm ers even outside of Europe are refusing to plant biotech
crops like genetically engineered com, and American companies have stopped using ethanol
in th eir skin care products." While these seem like incon sequential changes compared to
the extent of the global market, the (l ct that the EU can influence American standards and
en courage farmers to choose more expensive production options means that the EU is suc-
cessfully establishing itself as an economic "norm setter. ""I
The EU can use the se resources as economic hard power. Preferential market access
has been used to gain regulatory co ncessio ns, but it also provides a powerful incentive for
foreign states to support other EU goals. For example , the EU denied China access to its
armaments market through a trade embargo after the Tiananmen massacre of 1989; the
embargo help ed influence C hina's gradual improvements in protecting human rights until
the ban was Iified .:" However, the EU has become incre asingly un willing to use sanctio ns
to en act its poli cies. The sent iment among Europeans is th at since "governments can evade
sanctions' effects [and] th e real victims are likely to he innocent citizens of targeted na-
tion s,,,", sancti on s sho uld not be used . The EU can also manipulate development assistance
to influence other countries, espe cially in th e developing world . It is the world's " largest
donor of 'development assistance,"?' granting $44 biJlion in 2003, almost three times as
much as the US ."; By granting or withholding the se funds in respon se to another nati on's
poli cies, the EU might wield greater influence; however , the EU does not use development
assistance for the same reasons it do es not impose sancti on s. The EU does not care to pun-
ish citiz ens for the actions of their government, and thu s does not employ these m eth ods.
Though the EU has grea t potential for using economic hard power, it ch oo ses to rely on
others means of influence .
How DOES THE EU COMMAND WITH SOFT POWER?
The EU has become an expert at usin g soft power instead of hard power to achieve
its go als intemarionally. Soft power allows a nation to "obtain the outcomes it wants ...
because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, [and]
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aspir ing to its level of prosperi ty and openness ."~b A nation's soft po wer relies o n its ability
to maintain polit ical policies that "shape th e preferen ces of otliers ,"~7 and 0 11 the in tern a-
tion al reputation it can create. The EU is unique in its reliance 011 soft po we r rath er than
hard power; trad itio nally, the great globa l powers have relied 011 hard po we r capabilit ies
like a large standing al1 ny to give them legitimacy. The EU has no such capability . and yet
it con tin ues to act as a major player. It represents a new kind of grea t power: o ne th at uses
economic benefits and soft power po licies to work in its own national int er est, gr;lrIt hu-
ma nitarian aid, and attempt to solve international co nflicts. The EU has four chief means of
employing soft po wer: filling the power vacu urn left by mi strust of the US, making its ideals
attrac tive to the rest of th e world, mai nta ining its international repu tat ion , and capitalizing
on th e appeal of enlargeme nt.
According to John McC ol1n ick , the E U " relies upon soft power to ex press itself and
to achieve its objectives , and . . .finds itself at a moral adva ntage in an inte rna tio na l environ-
m ent where violence as a means ofachievi ng inf uence is detested and rejec ted. ,,~s Alth ou gh
int ern ational violen ce has not gon e co mpletely o ut of style as M cC ol1nick suggests, th e
modern political clima te is conducive to th e EU's focus o n soft power if th e EU can prove
that th is kind of influe nce is effect ive. T he world's only rea l supe rpo wer, th e US, has worn
ou t mu ch of its welcome o n th e other side of the world ; th e U nited States' "war o n terro r"
is becomi ng increasin gly unpopul ar and the co untry is no w regarded as a "b ull in th e glo bal
china shop." 29 T his is a consequence of wielding hard power unilaterally and displaying
littl e regard for the capabilities of ot her poorly armed na tio ns . Hard power and unilateralism
have lost th eir credi bility as th e only means of obtaining po wer, and the EU capitalizes on
th is disres pect for pol itical tools associated with th e United States. The EU has also prove d
th at it is wi lling to flex its political muscles in interna tio na l institutio ns, eve n when it mea ns
opposi ng th e United States. In 200 I, th e EU used its member states' 15vo tes to rem ove the
U ni ted States from th e U nited N ation s C ommissio n o n Human R ights, as protest against
the U S' refusal to join the Int ern ation al Criminal Court and the global landmine ban, as
well as its cont inued use of th e death pe nalty. B y stand ing up to th e United States, th e EU
signa led that it can be po werful in its ow n rig ht, and th at th e hard power tools used by th e
United States are not th e o nly meth od to influence interna tio nal polit ics.
T he E U 's stand ards, ideals, and struc ture have becom e increasingly attract ive to the
o utside world. N ot only has the orga niza tion ex tended its econo mic reach, but it has also
expa nded the acceptan ce of its politi cal culture . As th e largest source of humanitari an aid ,
prov iding 47 percent of th e world to tal in 2001, th e EU "b uys good wi ll and thus augments
[its] soft po wer even in regions where it has no obvio us or direct geopolitical int er est," 30
All over the world, othe r co un tries are adopting E U standa rds and policy frameworks, eve n
witho ut the EU providing eco no mic ince ntives . For exa mple, the E U 's poli cy on personal
data privacy - strictly limi ting th e way th at stat es can use personal info n ua tio n - has been
adopted in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, C hile, Japan, Peru , and Uruguay..ll Suc h
policy inheritances can enhance respec t for EU idea ls in thes e co unt ries, without th e EU
di rec tly int erven ing in th eir politics. The E U has engi neered a un iqu e reputatio n as an eco-
nomi c giant with a "business first" attitude and a w illingness to help developing co untries.
T his grant s the orga n izatio n a moral high ground fro m whic h it can critique th e Unit ed
States and pursue its ow n goal s, like fostering econ omic freedoms, protecting human rights,
and allowing thi rd world countries to develop and j oin the int ernational communiry.
T he EU' s reputation as a m ult ilateral organi zation is on e of its greatest asset s, beca use
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it serves as a model for a new type of region al institution and can tail or its resp onse to every
international political dilemma . The EU can "obtain th e outcomes it want s. . .because other
co untries wa nt to follo w it, admiri ng its values. em ulating its exa m ple, land] aspiring to its
level of prosper ity and open ness." .11 The Associati o n of Southeast Asian N atio ns (ASEAN)
has anno unced its int entions to form a " couunon m arket in goods, services, capital, and
labor by 2020," .1-' a mo ve inspired by Eu rop ean success . Other regional o rganizatio ns like
th e African Unio n and the So uth Am erican C o mm u nity of N at ion s also look to th e EU for
guidance, and "a ffinities with th eir institu tional cultures... are potentially important avenu es
for Europea n influ ence in th ose regions ." :" In additio n, th e EU can choose to be represent-
ed in every pol itical conve rsatio n by th e me m ber state w hose natio nal identiry or polit ical
structure is more closely aligned with the nation th e EU wants to influen ce . Other countries
are mor e likely to come to the diplomatic table if th ey feel that th e EU has an appreciation
for its need s; in return , th e EU can w ield influe nce in nl<ln y o the r parts of th e world .
In its im m ediate neighborhood. th e EU's 1I10st effective use of soft power is the influ-
en ce it can exert by the suggestio n of enlargeruent." In order to rec eive the ben efits of EU
m em bersh ip , potent ial members ado pt EU standards, cha nge their govern me ntal struct ures,
and adj ust th eir foreign and domestic pol icies to align more carefully wi th th e EU . The two
most recent additions to the EU , Romania and Bul garia, made hu ge co ncessions to j oin ;
th e EU made the " provision o f eco no mic aid partl y d epen dent on progress in area s such
as judicial and adm inistra tive reform":" in both co unt ries, encouraging them to ado pt fair
pract ice laws and restru cture thei r court systems. T hey resp o nded to th ese pressures and a
number of o the r co nditions, and success fully j oined th e E U in January of 20 07 . Another
exam ple of th e soft po wer influ ence that enlargement can have is th e effec t the EU has had
on Turkey. Although Turkey enjoys a trad e agreement that gra nts it most of th e co mmercial
pr ivileges of E U membership , th e co untry still seeks to j oin the E U. In respo nse to consid-
eration of its membership , Turkey has made improvements in human rig hts, reformed its
law s on the free dom of expressio n, limited the rol e of the an n y in its national po litics, and
improved its elec to ral processes." T he co untry had " drastically revised laws and po licies on
such sensitive issues as th e de ath pe nalty , th e tre atm ent of ethnic mino riti es, and the ro le of
th e m ilitary' ?" even before the E U had agreed to disc uss its membership; th e elusive ide a
of EU membership was enough to spur huge ch an ges in Turkey's gov ernment without any
forma l ne got iations w ith the EU. T he suggestio n ofe nlarge me nt, inclusion , and int egration
is a powerful tool; other countries want th e suc cess and influ ence th at the E U has crea ted
for itself, and the most dir ect m ean s of obtaining it is to join the EU.
IRAN: A CASE STUDY OF EUROPEAN SOFT POWER
In Iran , th e EU has taken the lead in negotiations regarding the cessatio n of the nucl ear
program, The dipl omat ic negoti ati on s, beginning in early 2003, hop ed to avoi d another
m ilitary con frontation in th e M iddle East, prevent Iran fro m o btai ning military nu clear
cap abilities, and protect the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty." By combi ning th e EU-3 (G reat
Britain , Germany. and Fran ce) along wi th the U nit ed States, Russia, and China (altogethe r
th e EU- 3+ 3) and work ing in co nj unct io n w ith UN Sec uri ty Counci l in volvem ent , the
EU hoped to attain consensus among th e major po we rs and project a united policy against
Irani an nucl ear proliferati on. In Octo be r of 2003, the EU-3 + 3 signed th e negotiations '
first agreement: in return for Europ ean recognit ion of 1r.1I1 's right to light wa te r reacto rs
for manufa cturing en ergy as well as other trad e programs , the Iranian government agree d
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to suspend nucl ear acti vities and allow Internation al Atomic Energy Agen cy ([AEA) in-
specto rs int o the country. 40 Despite early successes, th e negotiation s broke down in 2006;
Iran resumed th e production of enri ched uranium in April of that year and ann ounced its
int ention to install 3,000 centrifuges - eno ug h to mo ve forward with a nucl ear pr ogram ."
The EU-3+3 has since struggled w ith Iran 's rejection ofI AEA/ U N inspectors in early 200 7
and threats to the existen ce of Israel, amo ng a ho st of smaller co nflicts and pr obl ems. " T o
date, no satisfactory agreement has been reached, th ou gh the neg oti ations are co nti nuing. It
seems unlik ely that the EU-J +J will be able to obtain an agreement acceptable to all parties,
since both sides hold powerful GIrds and escalation may be immi ne nt.' :' In tenus of limiting
nuclear proliferation , th e negotiation s have been a failure.
But reaching an una ssailable agreement was not necessarily th e EU 's onl y goa l in Iran .
If one of th e EU 's obje ctiv es was to offer itself as a part of the negoti ations and promote the
organization as a reasonable alte rnative to the United States, it has projected th at image suc-
cessfully." Finding a reason able soluti on to Iranian nuclear demands is desirable , but the EU
also has mor e pragmatic go als: increasing the po wer of its own reputation and the prestige
of its international policies.' ; By leadin g the Iranian negotiations, the EU bolst ers its reputa-
tion, on e of its most influ ential soft power advantages, and carves out an important place for
itself in the mo st pressing co nflicts o f internatio nal secur ity and defense . Even though th e
EU has not been wh olly successful in co m pleting its stated obj ecti ves, it will benefit from
representing both th e EU and the W estern world o n the int ern ational stage.
THE SOFT POWER DILEMMA: CAN IT WORK?
The sources of Europ ean power have been identified , but it remains to be seen wheth-
er its relian ce on soft power is a formula for lasting internation al influence . A number of
problems remain for the EU regarding the effectiv eness of its power and th e limits of its
diplomatic tools, and th e EU 's international power is still being defined. Iran is an example
of the limit s of Europ ean power on th e global stage; the nucl ear co nflict is one of the most
dangerous situatio ns that the world faces, and the EU has shown that it canno t handle it
with soft power alon e. Its participation in the negoti ations has co nt ributed to its gro wing
reputation, but the EU was not able to solve the co nflict or succeed where th e United Stat es
has not.
The problem of security has th e potential to derail the EU 's reliance o n soft power.
The Europ ean Uni on's relationship with the Un ited States is espec ially troubling, because
the EU needs the US to provide its basic military legitimacy. The E U will co ntinue to rely
on the US o r another great power with military presence as lon g as it is without an arulY of
its own, whi ch gives it mu ch less leverage internationall y. The EU is associated with Ameri-
can milita ry operations in many co untries by its o w n accord or throu gh NATO, and if these
operation s go awry, th e EU is also respon sible . Even when the EU is not in agre em ent with
the United States' military policies, they have few means of opposing th ese decisions. As
member states' defense budgets continue to decline," it is qu estionable that they will be able
to pr otect themselves as needed.
But for no w, the EU occupies th e perfect position ; its security needs are pro vided for
with very little effort, and its poli cies have aligned closely with the United States. In situ-
ations wh ere EU and US policies have differed, th e EU has not been co mpletely tied to
American decisions. In Iraq, many EU countries refused to provide tro op s o r have since
recalled th em in the face of what many Europeans see as Am eri can hlilure. As a result , th e
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U S has been forced to act unilaterally , wh ich undermines the internati onal conununiry's
go odwiJJ. This vacuum is a p otential space for the EU to fill, sin ce it does not have the
military capabiliti es to act on its own lik e th e United Stat es and is an in stitution found ed Oil
mulrilareralisni . In fact, non-integration has its benefits. The diffi culties of integrati on assur e
o the r nations th at they ne ed not fear a militant or aggres sive EU , making them more likel y
to invest in th e European market and C0111e to the diplomatic tabl e. The EU wields 27 votes
in international institutions instead of only o ne , maintain s a reputation of unaffected com-
m erce and multilareralism, and represents th e "good cop " abroad, a perfect situation for an
o rganizatio n with the EU 's goals.:" Man y countries are att racted to th e idea of a co alition
of cooperati ve states, especially o ne th at has proved to be so economically succe ssful . The
ex iste nce of the union implies that it ca n manage diplomatic conflicts, balance differences
in foreign policy, and allow for national identities and biases, whi ch are all important for
resol ving an y int ern atio nal conflic t. The maintenance of m ember sta te sovereignty is actu-
<Ill y a boon, becau se it reminds other countries that th e EU is f.lI11ili ar w ith cooperating and
balancing national interests. Though soft power dearly has its limits - <IS sugge sted by the
ne gotiations with Iran - the EU still has significan t influence in international afEtirs.
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